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A.   Introduction 
 
What do we know about the results of decentralized service delivery? Verifying outcomes 
and results of decentralized policies is a very challenging exercise, given the large number of 
stakeholders involved. It is understandable that bilateral aid agencies and donors that have 
recommended decentralization have also stressed the importance of verifying outcomes of 
decentralized public policies. However, this is quite difficult to achieve in practice, especially 
in the developing country context. Only the more advanced OECD countries have moved 
effectively in this direction on a standardized basis, using the tools of performance budgeting 
(e.g. the UK—whereas France is the latest to do so). An approximation may be attempted to 
evaluate outcomes in the absence of a performance budgeting framework, but this requires 
the definition of a proper methodology that is common among jurisdictions and levels of 
government, and using information that may not be readily available. Consequently, the 
emerging empirical literature on the outcomes of decentralization is heavily focused on 
OECD countries, and particularly on the efficiency considerations of service delivery (see 
Ahmad, Brosio and Tanzi, 2008). 
 
Efficiency in decentralized provision is a focal concern for economists and it should be also 
for citizens, but it is not always the main goal of decentralization.  There are distinctive 
themes concerning decentralized service delivery in different parts of the world. In the 
developing world, , the issue of poverty reduction at the local level has been at the forefront 
of the policy debate. In Africa, the reemergence of democratic governance has paralleled  
poverty reduction as an overarching goal of decentralization.  In  Europe, both Western and 
Eastern, decentralization and federalization have been sought to accommodate  regional 
demands for autonomy based on ethnic, or cultural  differences. This is the case of Belgium, 
Spain and some of the countries born out of the break-up of Yugoslavia, In these cases 
citizens may be ready to trade lesser efficiency with government closer to home..   
 
In countries, such as Peru, decentralization is seen as a mechanism to share political power 
and prevent a resurgence of centralization (Ahmad and García-Escribano, 2007)—whereas in 
Pakistan the decentralization efforts by a military government was seen as a mechanism to 
bypass established political parties (Devarajan et al., in Ahmad and Brosio, forthcoming). In 
Bolivia, decentralization was initiated partly to redress the economic discrimination suffered 
by the indigenous population, but is sought now by the richest regions to protect for them the 
resources coming from the exploitation of natural resources. 
 
From the stylized facts and the recent literature, including some papers included in this 
volume, we highlight some of the critical elements that are needed to assess properly the 
outcomes of decentralization with a focus also on distributional issues and poverty reduction. 
The paper is organized around three sections. The first section tackles definitional issues  and  
presents the various points of view from which the outcomes of decentralization might be 
analyzed. The second section presents stylized trends in decentralization around the world. 
The third provides a review of the empirical literature.  
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B. Decentralization and Service Delivery: general considerations and definitional 
issues. 
Decentralization is understood, in general, as a process through which the role and functions 
of the subnational governments are expanded. This expansion can take place through three 
main different processes—these are not necessarily in actual or suggested order of sequence.  
 
The first process is that of political decentralization. In countries with democratic 
institutions at all levels, political decentralization means devolution of political authority or 
of electoral capacities to subnational actors. Typical examples are the popular election of 
governors and mayors, (previously appointed by local councils or by central authorities), 
constitutional reforms that reinforce the political autonomy of subnational governments and 
electoral reforms designed to augment political competition at the local levels. 
 
The second process relates to fiscal decentralization. This involves a transfer of 
expenditure responsibilities to lower level local governments, financed by a combination of 
own and other sources of revenues, including transfers. Unless complete functions are 
devolved, the decentralization process may remain incomplete. Also, the manner in which 
responsibilities are assigned, e.g., by unfunded mandates; or earmarked or tied transfers, may 
reduce the “effective autonomy” of the local governments. Similarly, without own-source 
revenue at the margin, the local governments may lack incentives for proper 
“accountability”, as they might be able to leverage the federal government or pass on the 
consequences of their actions to other jurisdictions (see Ahmad and Brosio, 2006, and 
Ambrosiano and Bordignon, 2006). Further, with access to borrowed resources, and in the 
absence of credible hard budget constraints, there is a substantial risk that the costs of sub-
national operations may be transferred to other jurisdictions, particularly at higher levels. 
Even in developed countries, there are significant risks to subnational operations as the 
current crisis in credit markets has recently illustrated for developed countries. 
 
The third process relates to regulatory decentralization. This does not imply an 
appreciable transfer of financial resources or assignments, although its impact may be 
considerable for citizens (i.e., regulation of car emissions). Pure regulatory decentralization is 
much less frequent than fiscal decentralization. In fact, there has been a substantial 
centralization of regulations, particularly in the field of environmental policies, health, and 
even financial policies.  
 
Both fiscal and regulatory decentralization imply transfer of some decision-making power 
over the use of public (fiscal) or private (regulatory) resources from the central to the 
subnational governments. Recognition that shifting of decision-making power is the essence 
of decentralization is crucial to the identification and the use of proper indicators of fiscal 
decentralization. For example, a simple reassignment of health expenditure from the central 
to regional budgets does not imply per se an increase in the degree of decentralization if it is 
not accompanied by the transfer of some decision-making power relating to this 
decentralized expenditure.  
 
If the reassignment is financed by tied transfers, regional budgets would show a higher 
amount of expenditure, but since regions have to follow centrally set instructions for the use 
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of these resources, no effective decentralization takes place (regions act simply as 
hierarchical subordinated agents of the central government).1 Conversely, there can be real 
decentralization even if the share of regional expenditure or revenues is not changed, but if 
more decision-making power is devolved to regions concerning the existing resources. This 
poses a difficulty for empirical work—since the extent to which a spending assignment can 
be treated as a local responsibility depends on the financing arrangements, in particular 
whether tied transfers are involved. 
 
Outcomes can be examined within single countries, where local jurisdictions have different 
degrees of autonomy (asymmetry). Or, if standardized information were available (even the 
IMF’s GFS data is not complete in this regard) it might be possible to observe different 
countries with different degrees of decentralization. Proper analysis requires adequate data on 
outcomes, efficiency, and distributional outcomes. Evaluation of the outcomes of devolution 
would require assessments over a sufficiently long time frame, given the lags in adjusting 
policies and assignments.   
 
Another  relevant obstacle to the proper assessment of the outcomes of decentralization is 
that concurrent reforms are often involved. In many cases, decentralization requires changes 
of policy at higher levels of government that accompany and facilitate the process. A typical 
example is the reform of the civil service, or of public financial management systems. In 
theses cases it becomes difficult to ascribe success or failure to the lower level of government  
that implements the reform. Education in Ethiopia provides an extremely relevant example of 
this difficulty. Progress in school enrolment was substantial after decentralization, and was 
achieved by using three distinct instruments: construction of schools, use of local languages 
and  adaptation of school calendar to seasonality of crops. The construction of schools lowers 
barriers to entry by reducing the distance that children have to travel,  in addition to 
providing the necessary expansion in capacity.  In Ethiopia, construction of school premises 
is a typical local task, requiring use of resources and effort at the local level. The use of local 
languages and the school calendar lower barriers to entry, especially for poor people, and are 
reputed to have been quite successful in Ethiopia. They are mainly regulatory and  have been 
initiated by the federal government, with some adaptation to local circumstances by 
subnational governments. Without the two regulatory measures the impact of school 
construction would have been much reduced.  
 
C. Some stylized trends in decentralization of service delivery 
As mentioned above, most countries have experimented with variants of decentralization 
reforms in the last three decades, addressing different motivations. A few have embarked in 
ambitious decentralization processes requiring constitutional revisions. The most notable 
cases have been the federalization of Belgium and of Ethiopia, the regionalization of Spain, 
Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The post-apartheid constitution of South Africa 
presents an interesting case of a quasi-federal system. The decentralization processes in 
natural resource rich countries, including Indonesia, Nigeria, and more recently in Sudan and 
Iraq, are clearly driven by considerations to keep the country together. Noticeable 
                                                 
1
 Of course, this assumes that there is full information on sub-national operations, without which tied transfers 
could degenerate into spending others’ moneys without adequate supervision. 
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decentralization reforms have also been introduced in almost all Latin American countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa presents a wide array of decentralization processes, some instigated by 
donors, whereas others were political economy solutions to perceived problems of 
nationhood or governance. In addition to above-mentioned cases of Ethiopia and South 
Africa, extensive decentralization reforms have been introduced in Uganda and Nigeria. 
 
European trends 
Increasing efficiency is a motivation of the decentralization in France, and partly in Italy. In 
Italy, the economic divide between rich and poor regions led to a demand for autonomy from 
the former. A larger subnational tax autonomy had led to a demand for larger redistributive 
transfers by the poor regions and to an expansion of public spending.  The increased tax 
burden is resented by the voters of the rich regions. In France, decentralization reforms were 
started in 1982 (with a Socialist President) with the devolution of functions and the creation, 
in 1984, of the decentralized public service (Fonction publique térritoriale). The powers of 
the prefects vis à vis subnational governments have shifted from control to support. Since 
1986 regional councilors are popularly elected. Following the 2001 budget reforms that led to 
the introduction of performance budgeting, the 2003 constitutional reform (sponsored by a 
center/right government) aims at increasing the role of subnational governments by 
introducing the subsidiarity principle, involving both policy and fiscal autonomy 
(Documentation Française, 2007). 
 
Decentralization has also taken place in all new Eastern EU member countries. Poland, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic have introduced a regional level of government, in addition 
to the initial focus on improved local governments—largely to benefit from the availability 
of EU structural funds that are made available to intermediate levels of government. In the 
Balkans, Croatia and Macedonia have also moved expenditure functions down to their 
subnational governments. 
 
A few countries including Denmark and Norway also recentralized their system of territorial 
government. Higher education has been recentralized and the most important responsibility 
of the counties, management of hospitals, has been transferred to newly created regions. 
Denmark follows a typical Scandinavian trend in health care, where hospitals have been 
transferred to new and single-function regional entities, while the role of municipalities in 
primary care has been strengthened (Rico and Leon, 2005). Table 1 presents information on 
decentralization trends. 
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Table 1. Main traits of intergovernmental relations in selected countries. 
Countries Share of 
subnational 
spending in 
general 
government 
spending   
Share of 
subnational 
spending in  
general 
government 
spending  
Main traits of intergovernmental 
relations 
Recent reforms   
 1985 2001   
Australia  49,9 Federal system VAT administration by center 
on behalf of the states 
Austria 28,4 28,5 Federal  but highly federally 
regulated system 
The Constitutional Convention 
recently fostered debate on 
constitutional reform of 
intergovernmental relations. 
Belgium 31,8 34,0 Federalization based on linguistic 
divides 
Transformed from unitary to 
federal state 
Bolivia  34,5 Three-layered unitary  system  Powers of municipalities have 
been considerably increased. 
Provinces are presently asking 
substantial but asymmetrical 
powers 
Brazil  44,5* Federal system based on three layers 
of government 
National coordination of sales 
taxes is a urgent priority 
Canada 54,5 56,5 Federal system  Asymmetries (Quebec)  
China  70,0 Highly decentralized system, 
amounting to a de facto federation 
Recentralization of taxing 
power 
Colombia   Three-layered unitary system Extensive devolution of 
resources to provinces 
Denmark 53,7 57,8 Unitary system with strong 
municipal government 
Recentralization of higher 
education and health since 2006 
France 16,1 18,6 Regional system Regulatory, fiscal and political 
decentralization 
Germany 37,6 36,1 Federal system with extended 
concurrent responsibilities 
Reduced intensity of 
equalization transfers after 
completion of re-unification 
Italy 25,6 29,7  Fiscal, regulatory and political 
decentralization 
Mexico  23,1** Federal system with high political 
and low fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal and regulatory 
decentralization since late 
1980’s, with devolution to 
States of basic education (1992) 
and health care (1996) 
Poland  33,3 *** 
 
Unitary Political and fiscal 
decentralization with emphasis  
on the local level 
South Africa  49,1 The post-Apartheid constitution 
introduced a quasi federal system 
Devolution of extensive 
responsibilities for education 
and health to provinces 
Spain 25,0 32,2 Regional, quasi-federal system  Completed transition toward an 
almost federal system 
Switzerland  67,38 Federal system  Equalization transfers from 
federation to cantons  
United Kingdom 22,2 25,9 Regional Introduction of regional 
government in Scotland and 
Wales 
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Sources: Quantitative information derives from OECD (2002), World Bank (2004) and from papers 
quoted in the text 
* 1998 ** 2000***2005 
 
The motivation to decentralize, or centralize, often reflects complex and not always 
transparent political debates. In the most cases, decentralization is a multi-step, long duration 
process, carried out by different political coalitions, and impacts different layers of 
government differently. Italy provides an example. Decentralization since 1993 has 
successively involved: a) the devolution of taxing powers to municipalities and regional 
governments: b) the popular election of mayors and of provincial and regional governors; c) 
the devolution of important expenditure responsibilities and legislative functions to regional 
governments and, d) the elimination of many central government controls on subnational 
units. These reforms—some of which are constitutional—have been implemented by both 
center/left and center/right coalitions and have reflected pressures applied by regionally-
based political movements. There are still very few analyses of the impact of decentralization 
in Italy on effective service delivery. But given the complexity of the process, it would be 
almost impossible to ascribe the results to any one of these specific policy changes. 
 
Spain has almost completed a transition to a quasi-federal system, driven by the goal of 
accommodating the demand for autonomy coming from the rich, linguistic regional 
minorities.. The process was set in motion by the 1978 constitution that granted a high level 
of autonomy to the historical nationalities of Navarra, the Basque County and Catalonia, 
while recognizing the right of the other regions to attain a similar level of self-government 
(Agranoff and Gallarin, 1997, Moreno, 2002, Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2002). Spanish 
decentralization has been typically asymmetric, thus providing an excellent ground for 
empirical analyses of the impact of decentralization.  
 
Similarly, federalization in Belgium and regionalization in the U.K. derive from 
historical/linguistic/cultural divides. In the Eastern European countries, decentralization has 
been sponsored by the EU and by international organizations, replicating the pattern 
observed in many developing countries, where the consolidation of democracy, efficiency 
reasons, and expectation of better governance dominate. The EU, however, does not sponsor 
a particular model of decentralized governance, although the European Charter of Local Self-
Government  prescribes strict guidelines in favor of subnational autonomy for signatory 
countries. 
 
Demands for more power and autonomy from local elected officials and bureaucrats are 
important. All OECD countries have longstanding traditions of decentralized government 
and thus strong constituencies in favor of decentralization. 
 
 
Developing countries: Indonesia   
The path towards decentralization has been more hesitant in Asian countries, with the notable 
exceptions of Indonesia since 2000. Indonesia had achieved some success with 
“deconcentrated” service delivery under the Suharto years (Shah, 1999), and the 
decentralized model reflects the reaction to the centralized power, and has focused more on a 
more equitable appropriate “sharing of natural resources.” Indonesia has a three tiered system 
of territorial government, and the decentralization in the post-Suharto period was focused on 
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the third tier of government, namely districts and municipalities, in order to preserve the 
unitary structure of the constitution. The sequencing of the devolution of spending 
responsibilities was governed by practical considerations a well as political economy (with 
both the Habibi and Wahid administrations relying on the support of regional interests). The 
success with poverty reduction is more mixed—despite the recent growth, the total number 
of people in poverty remains stubbornly high (fluctuating between 35 million and the current 
level of 37 million); the unemployment rate in 2007 was the same as in 2002; and inequality 
appears to have increased significantly since 2003. Adequate safety nets are needed for the 
urban poor and landless populations. However, these are not easy to define in Indonesia.  
 
Although the Indonesian government has taken steps to strengthen governance institutions at 
the central level, including—a new budget classification and accounting system, as well as 
the treasury single account, these are not used by lower level governments and it is difficult 
to order standardized and timely information for more effective macroeconomic 
management. It is also important for the central government to be aware in a timely manner 
about the quality of the sub-national spending in key areas such as education, health and 
infrastructure. Given the weaknesses in reporting and monitoring of sub-national operation, 
the central government has reintroduced centralized cash transfers to compensate the poor for 
the recent steep adjustments in the level of food and fuel prices in May 2008. 
 
China 
China presents an interesting case of a unitary country and a single party-system, but where 
provinces enjoyed considerable de facto autonomy (Yagi, 2004, Ahmad et al., 2002). This 
was further consolidated in the post 1978 economic reforms, and  local governments enjoyed 
increasing autonomy in terms of expenditure and growth promoting policies (Qian and 
Weingast, 1997). While the initial informality in intergovernmental relations was an element 
in “market preserving reforms”, declining central revenues and a fuzzy legal framework 
posed a threat to macroeconomic stability and future growth prospects. As a reaction, the 
central government moved to centralize its revenue raising powers and in 1994 established a 
central tax administration to manage central and shared taxes (traditionally managed by the 
provinces) with a view to more effective macroeconomic management, and also to reduce the 
growing disparities among provinces (Ahmad et al., 2002). Given the restructuring of the 
system of state owned-enterprises, the central government is now moving to clarify spending 
responsibilities across levels of government and to hold lower levels accountable for their 
own effectively devolved functions—together with a strengthening of monitoring and  
evaluation capabilities of the central government, and a standardization of budget 
classification and treasury single accounts at all levels of government—so that there is better 
comparative information on who spends what and at what time. 
 
Indian sub-continent 
The countries in the Indian sub-continent share common institutions and organizational 
structures that reflected the British colonial past. The Government of India Act (1935) 
provided autonomy to states/provinces, with the creation of separate and concurrent lists of 
functions (Singh, 2003). Most of these structures carried over to independent India and 
Pakistan, which both became federal countries, where individual states/provinces retained a 
unitary structure. In India, the push towards further responsibilities to responsible local 
government came in the 1990s,with the panchayati raj changes to the institutional structure.  
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A similar push towards local governments in Pakistan by the military government at the end 
of the 1990s  became discredited as it was also seen as a move to bypass the political process 
and the main parties that were organized at the provincial level (see also Devarajan et al; and 
Bardhan, forthcoming). Unclear spending responsibilities, together with an absence of own-
source revenues continue to hamstring the decentralization process—that is brought into 
severe reevaluation by the failure to improve service delivery in the sensitive tribal regions 
that also happen to be among the poorest in the country. 
 
Latin America 
A common motivation for the decentralization process in Latin American countries is the 
reaction to decades of military rule in many of the countries. In other cases, the 
decentralization is based on the central government’s desire to share with other levels the 
increasing political costs of governance of complex systems. This motivation applies 
especially to Bolivia (at least, until recent events that signal increasing resistance of the 
richest regions to the sharing of resources with the poorest ones) and Colombia.  
 
In Mexico, the decentralization process was also seen as a reaction to seven decades of 
virtual single party “centralized” rule. While the political power of the state governors has 
grown, on the fiscal side, there is a lack of clarity on spending functions, the states lack 
effective revenue tools, and the transfer system is opaque. The most effective poverty 
reduction program happens to be central, the Progresa/Opportunidades (see Ahmad et al. 
2008 and Ahmad, this volume). 
 
The centralization of revenues, together with overlapping spending responsibilities and 
extensive earmarking of transfers extend far beyond the federal countries, such as Mexico, to 
virtually all the unitary countries in Latin America, from Bolivia (one of the earliest countries 
to decentralize) to Colombia and Peru. In most cases, there are very weak governance 
institutions with non-standard classifications and accounting frameworks, absence of treasury 
single accounts and weak reporting. Brazil is an exception—while it also has overlapping 
responsibilities; it has the most advanced focus on own-source revenues, treasury single 
accounts and standardized reporting mechanisms. It also has had some success in 
decentralized service delivery and poverty reduction programs. 
 
Decentralization and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa presents the most challenging context for decentralization. The 
concerned countries are extremely poor and with limited traditions of democratic 
governance. Huge ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages characterize most of them, 
originating a demand for strong autonomy and increasing the difficulties of the task of 
keeping the countries together.   
Institutional arrangements and sequencing of decentralization 
The institutional/legal framework of a country determines the starting point for assessing the 
scope for decentralization. A distinction needs to be made between federal countries, such as 
Nigeria and Ethiopia (or South Africa, which is a quasi-federal country), and unitary states 
  12  
 
(e.g., Mozambique, Niger, Senegal). In addition, there are some three tier/regional systems 
(e.g., Mali and Uganda). 
 
The emphasis on regional or sub-national governance in some cases has been driven by the 
dictates of a political compromise to solve festering conflicts, as in the DR Congo. In such 
cases, the emphasis is more on “co-opting regional or ethnic factions” with promises of 
sharing of natural resources and wealth, with relatively little focus on effectiveness of service 
delivery. 
 
In the federal context, the sub-national assignments and responsibilities are typically divided 
between regions (states or provinces) and local governments, and may be clearly specified in 
the constitution or higher level laws (see e.g., Constitution of South Africa, Act 108, 1996, 
schedule 5 for exclusive responsibilities, and schedule 4 for concurrent responsibilities 
between the center and the provinces). It is interesting to note that education and health care 
are concurrent responsibilities between the center and the provinces in South Africa --these 
are not municipal responsibilities, as in many other African countries. Nigerian attempts to 
assign primary education to local governments were constrained by capacity limitations and 
the absence of clear own-source revenues and governance difficulties (more on this below). 
 
Clarifying assignments 
Overlapping responsibilities are the norm in most African states, with a gradual transfer of 
functions and responsibilities—such as in Uganda. This has led to contradictions between 
mandates (universal access to free primary education) and the financing available, when the 
center does not fully control the numbers of persons employed, and the sub-national 
governments do not face a hard budget constraint (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004). 
 
Assigning full responsibility has been attempted in Federal countries, such as Nigeria and 
Ethiopia, e.g., for primary education assigned to the lowest tier of government (see Table A1 
in the Appendix). However, capacity constraints, together with the absence of own-source 
revenues and other weaknesses in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations, have 
resulted in an effective reinstatement of overlapping responsibilities.  
 
In the Nigerian case, after the implementation of the new constitution, several local 
governments played their main political card—not paying the health workers or teachers 
(Khemani, 2006). This forced the center to pay these wages through the conversion of 
municipal transfers into “earmarked grants” for wages. But this again faced the intractable 
issue of implementation of centrally determined policies at the local level with incomplete or 
weak information, including on the number of teachers. The “middle tier” states have been 
co-opted to assist with the determination of the rolls and ensuring the transfers actually reach 
the relevant teachers or health workers, involving a return to overlapping responsibilities. 
The Ethiopian experience, with effective sequencing of decentralization/deconcentration and 
strong leadership, has been more successful, but the federal government has effectively 
maintained  a firm grip over all levels of governments. 
 
The Kenyan constitution, still under discussion, attempts a clearer delineation of 
responsibilities for education and health care, making a distinction e.g., between primary and 
secondary education, assigned to districts, and tertiary education assigned to the center. 
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However, on other crucial issues, such as the role of local governments the constitutional text 
is silent..  
 
In South Africa, the critical functions of education or health care were not devolved to local 
governments, but to the provinces—given the substantial externalities associated with these 
functions, and the possibility of “game-play” that has become apparent in cases such as 
Nigeria (and in several Latin American countries). These issues become clearer with the 
evaluation of public service delivery outcomes in several African countries—where the 
requisite information is available. 
 
Governance and monitoring 
A coherent framework for consistent decision-making across all levels of government would 
be desirable. However, standard public financial management principles are weak in the 
African context, as noted in the World Bank-Fund HIPC tracking exercise  and are even 
weaker at the sub-national level these African countries. 
 
Attempts to involve the local communities to assist with monitoring the use of special 
purpose transfers and donor funds, as in Uganda, have had some success. However, these do 
not per se overcome the weaknesses of the design of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and 
the absences of effective incentives, together with the generation of information and 
application of sanctions needed for good governance. 
 
Monitoring by citizens at the local level is a positive factor, but has to be based on solid 
public financial management systems and processes, and is not a substitute for these 
foundations. Attempts to by-pass standardized reporting requirements, through the use of 
contracts and local monitoring are subject to all the uncertainties associated with a weak base 
line, audit institutions and limited information or sanctions. This may result in some patchy 
successes, but cannot be a basis for rapid decentralization. Given significantly enhanced 
capabilities in certain regions in most countries, such as in capitals and major urban centers, 
there may be a case for more rapid devolution of responsibilities in these regions—leading to 
asymmetric solutions. 
 
Several donors and international agencies have emphasized the importance of performance 
outcomes, especially for sub-national public service delivery, in order to achieve more 
effective poverty-reduction. As a consequence, several countries are being encouraged to 
move towards performance budgeting. Desirable as this may be a shift to performance 
budgeting, without adequate preparation of the public financial management system, risks a 
loss of control and information and could paradoxically generate greater corruption and rent-
seeking. Again, careful preparation and sequencing is essential.  
 
 
D. Expected Outcomes of decentralization: a survey of the literature 
In this section, we examine some cross-country and single country studies. 
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A number of papers discuss decentralization outcomes in individual countries,2 others 
provide international comparisons. The cross-country studies are generally constrained by 
limited availability of comparable data to use a reduced-form relationship between 
decentralization and efficiency.3 Assessments for single countries can, potentially, overcome 
the control variables issue and provide firmer results. Many studies use data from different 
sources—mainly budgets, administrative sources, and increasingly household survey data.  
 
The empirical literature on decentralization and efficiency can be arranged in four distinct 
groups. The first group of studies link  decentralization  with production efficiency, and 
forms the largest group. The OECD evidence is summarized in Ahmad, Brosio and Tanzi 
(2008). 
 
A second group of papers refer to preference matching and decentralization. This is 
important considering, the more so when cultural/ethnic motivations are important in the 
impetus for decentralization. However, there are relatively few papers addressing this issue, 
and most consider it jointly with growth issues. 
 
A third group of few papers relates decentralization to convergence of service delivery 
levels. According to the theory, decentralization should decrease convergence, when 
heterogeneity of preferences and disparities of economic conditions prevail. However, it does 
not imply that centralized provision ensures uniformity of levels. For example, in Italy, major 
differences are commonly observed among regions at different levels of development in the 
actual levels of centrally provided services, such as tax administration, education, health or 
the postal service. This may reflect neglect by national politicians, slack and bureaucratic 
capture in deconcentrated agencies. It is expected that decentralization could bring 
convergence, particularly if accompanied by introduction of uniform standards and effective 
transfers.   
 
Fourth, a large number of papers examine decentralization and growth. It is hard to argue 
that overall economic growth could depend on decentralization. However, one of the crucial 
goals pursued by local politicians is the promotion of growth in their areas, and this may 
have an impact on overall growth. The origins of the literature linking decentralization to 
growth can be traced out to Oates (1993), who argued that the gains from decentralization 
should also apply to a dynamic framework of economic growth. This is because centrally 
determined policies do not consider adequately local conditions in the provision of public 
goods and services, such as those regarding infrastructure and education. It is argued that 
economic growth might be more rapid with decentralization if more resources go to public 
                                                 
2
 There are several papers on Spain. Spain provides excellent opportunities for testing theories about the impact 
of decentralization. Firstly, Spain has experienced an important process of fiscal decentralization since the re-
establishment of democracy and the Constitution of 1978. Secondly, the timing of decentralization has not been 
equal for all Autonomous Communities (AC). Some AC’s have assumed devolved responsibilities earlier than 
the other, thus allowing researchers to examine the impact of decentralization with reference to two distinct 
samples: one with decentralized and the other will still centralized responsibilities. 
 
3
 The dependent variable is usually a comparable but simple indicator of policy outcomes, while 
decentralization is represented by fiscal indicators based mostly on the relative shares of central and subnational 
governments in total national public expenditure and/or revenue.  
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investment; health and education policies are better targeted to growth, and in sum this 
produces more growth.  In other words, local preferences are growth-oriented. A simpler 
approach focuses mostly on productive efficiency. The main hypothesis is that if 
decentralization promotes more efficient use of resources, it should also result in higher rates 
of growth for the whole economy.  
 
There are also a number of arguments against a positive link between decentralization and 
growth. For example, decentralization could work against growth if discourages big 
investment projects with growth-conducive spillovers across regions. It may discourage the 
production of genuine public goods. Moreover, political objectives may emphasize equity 
and not growth—elected politicians want results within their terms in office. 
 
Production efficiency 
Barankay and Lockwood (2006) examine the relationship between educational outcomes and 
decentralization in Switzerland. They show: a) that it is possibly to overcome most of 
problems associated with information constraints and, b) that decentralization does in fact 
contribute to improve outcomes. In Switzerland responsibility for education has always been 
cantonal, although the federal government equalizes across cantons. Cantons can devolve 
some of expenditure responsibilities to their local governments and they effectively do so. It 
is thus possible to observe different degrees of decentralization in education between 
cantons.  
 
Educational outcomes are measured in the study by the share of 19-year population that 
passes the final exams (Maturité) to enter University.4 The index of decentralization is 
measured by share of education expenditure by the local governments in each canton over the 
sum of local and cantonal expenditure for education. In other words, the index shows the 
degree of education expenditure within each canton:   
 
Dct =
LEct
LEct + CEct
; 
 
 
where  Dct  is the index of canton c in year t,  
LEct  is the sum of education expenditure in all counties of canton c in year t and  
CEct   is education expenditure at the cantonal level in year t.  
 
The use of a purely fiscal variable, such as the expenditure share, entails the risk that it does 
not adequately represent the degree of effective autonomy of local government. To solve the 
problem, Barankay and Lockwood examine cantonal regulations in four crucial areas for 
education: a) appointing teachers; b) determining the pay level of teachers; c) granting 
                                                 
4
 Some problems have to be noted referring to the use of this measure of outcome. Upper secondary education 
is mostly a responsibility of cantons while local governments are fully responsible for primary education. Their 
expenditure and policies are thus impacting minimally on Maturité. To partially account for this fact Barankay 
and Lockwood refer results at Maturité to the degree of decentralization in the years where the concerned 
students were enrolled in primary schools, but clearly the main impact on Maturité derives from years spent in 
secondary education. Finally, there is no federal intervention in exams that could ensure uniformity of criteria. 
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teachers’ incentives and d) organizing the structure of school. Apparently, decentralization of 
expenditure is closely associated with higher local decision-making power, especially for 
teachers’ incentive pay. Local government expenditure for education is mainly for teacher’s 
salaries. Thus, when the number of teachers or the pay levels increase, the degree of 
decentralization also varies within cantons. Secondly, variation in expenditures for teachers’ 
salaries is induced by changes in the size of the student population. If it increases, local 
government have to provide more teachers, since cantons impose minimum class sizes. Also, 
changes in student numbers induce changes in the indicator of decentralization. Variations in 
outcomes can thus be meaningfully associated with changes in decentralization if the number 
of students does not impact on outcomes. 
 
Finally, Barankay and Lockwood regress for 20 years (1982-2002) the Maturité results on 
their chosen index of decentralization after adding a number of variables that control use of 
inputs and canton and year fixed effects. Results show that educational attainment is 
positively and significantly related to the degree of decentralization. The absolute impact of 
the latter is also substantial. According to the estimate, if the decentralization index increases 
by 10 percentage points, the share of students obtaining the Maturité increases by 
3,5 percent. Thus, cantons seem to play an important role in ensuring effective outcomes. 
 
Table 2. Selected papers on productive efficiency and convergence 
Author(s) Countries of 
reference 
Period of 
reference 
Dependent 
variable 
Decentralization 
Index 
Main results 
Ahlin Asa and Eva 
Mörk  
 
Sweden  1989-2000 Convergence in 
per student 
spending and 
teacher-pupil 
ratio 
Regulatory 
variables 
Little evidence 
on convergence 
Balaguer-Coll et al.  Spain 
(1.315 
municipalities) 
1995-2000 
 
Output of local 
services 
Range of 
responsibilities 
(regulatory and 
fiscal) 
Decentralization 
increases  
efficiency 
Barankay and 
Lockwood 
Switzerland 
(26 cantons) 
1982-2000  
 
Education 
attainment:  
Fiscal and 
regulatory: local 
on cantonal 
expenditure 
controlled for 
regulatory 
powers 
Decentralization 
increases  
Efficiency 
Cantarero Prieto 
David and Marta 
Pascual Sanchez 
15 EU member 
countries 
1993-2003 Infant mortality 
ratio and life 
expectancy  at 
national level 
Fiscal 
decentralization: 
local on total 
expenditure 
Decentralization 
improves 
outcomes 
Crivelli, Luca, 
Massimo Filippini 
and  Ilaria Mosca  
Switzerland 
(26 cantons 
1996-2001 Expenditure 
and input 
measures for 
health 
No specific 
decentralization 
index 
Huge disparities 
associated with 
decentralization 
and federalism 
 
 
      
Inchauste Bolivia 
Municipalities 
2001 - 2005 Education and 
public works 
No specific 
index 
Provision of 
additional funds 
does not bring 
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substantial results 
Jakubowski and 
Topińska 
Poland: 
Local 
governments 
1999-2003 Various 
variables 
referring to 
education 
Fiscal regulatory 
decentralization 
Mixed results 
Jimenez and Smith  Canada (10 
provinces) 
1979-1995 
 
Infant mortality 
rate 
Fiscal 
decentralization  
Decentralization 
reduces infant 
mortality 
Montero-Granados 
and de Dios 
Jiménez 
Spain  
(17 
autonomous 
communities) 
1980-2001 Life expectancy 
at birth and 
infant mortality 
Regulatory 
(before and after 
devolution of 
responsibilities) 
No clear  
convergence: 
regions with low 
levels improve, 
but  greater 
dispersion of 
outcomes 
emerges 
Robalino , Picazo 
and Voetberg  
High-income 
countries 
Spain 
1970-1995 Infant mortality 
ratio 
Fiscal 
decentralization: 
subnational on 
total national 
expenditure 
Positive impact 
declining with 
increases of GDP 
Salinas Peña  Spain 
(50 provinces) 
1980-2003 
 
Survival rate: 
proportion of 
students in last 
course of 
compulsory 
education who 
access to non-
compulsory 
education 
Regulatory 
(before and after 
devolution of 
responsibilities) 
Decentralization  
is associated with 
positive 
outcomes 
 
  
Source: Ahmad, Brosio and Tanzi (2008). 
 
 
It should be noted, however, that the system of transfers in Switzerland has been reformed 
(since the paper was written) as the authorities felt that the previous system, in which 
transfers are linked to variables under the control of cantons, provided an incentive to 
increase costs—generating macroeconomic inefficiencies.  
 
A similar analysis is conducted by Salinas Peña (2007) on Spanish schools. Spain provides, 
through its asymmetric regionalization, unique opportunity for checking the outcomes of 
decentralization. The central government has retained the responsibility for defining the 
structure and setting national guidelines and standards for education policies, leaving other 
competences to the regions. Salinas Peña uses as an indicator of outcomes—the share of 
students who complete post/secondary education (Bachillerato) to those enrolled in last year 
of compulsory education, assuming that a good level of education quality will induce 
students to stay at school.  Typical variables explaining educational outcomes, such as family 
income, or the size of classes, are used for control purposes, while a few dummies are used to 
distinguish between regions that acceded to education responsibilities in different years. The 
fiscal discipline of regions is controlled via the introduction of the surplus/deficit in the 
regional budget. Different specifications of the chosen model are tested. The results show 
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some problems referring to the control variables, most of which do not show the expected 
sign. Decentralization is positively and significantly correlated with the survival rate in two 
out of three specifications. However, earlier decentralized regions are at the same time those 
with a higher per capita income. As income is also a determinant of the survival rate, the link 
of the latter with decentralization may be blurred. The dependent variable is also correlated 
positively with fiscal discipline, supporting a basic tenet of decentralization theory that 
maintains that the benefits of decentralization are also dependent on the quality of 
decentralization. 
 
Jimenez and Smith (2005) try to trace the impact of decentralization on health care outcomes 
proxied by infant mortality, with reference to Canada during 1975–1995. This shows higher 
variation among Canadian provinces than life expectancy. First, the authors attempt to check 
the production efficiency of decentralization with a single step model, where infant mortality 
is regressed on a decentralization index and a number of control variables. Secondly, they 
proceed to estimate a two-step model. In the first step, provincial expenditure for health is 
regressed on the index of decentralization and on a number of control variables, such as 
transfers from the central government, private sector expenditure, birth rates and the like. In 
the second step, the authors proceed again to check the impact of decentralization on infant 
mortality by substituting actual provincial expenditure for education with an estimated one. 
The purpose of the two-step exercise is to control the impact of decentralization on 
preference-matching and then to proceed to control the efficiency effect. 
 
The results show a negative and significant relationship between infant mortality and the 
decentralization. More specifically, reduction of mortality is closely dependent on provincial 
expenditure on health: roughly a 1 percent increase in provincial expenditure on health 
stimulated a 3.8 percent reduction in infant mortality.  
 
Unfortunately, the reliability of the results is reduced by the indicator of decentralization 
used, which is based on the provincial share of total health care in that province.5 By not 
controlling for the effective subnational decision-making power, the index shows mostly the 
propensity to spend for health by a provincial government and its municipal governments. 
Moreover, as federal expenditure in each province is not a substitute for subnational 
expenditure; its relative size is not an indicator of degree of decentralization of expenditure.6 
 
                                                 
5
 The indicator is represented by the formula that follows: 
 
Dpt =
MEH pt + PEH pt + SSFpt
MEH pt + PEH pt + SSFpt + FEH pt
 
where  MEHpt is  health expenditure by all municipalities in year t; PEHpt is provincial expenditure for health in 
the same year, SSFpt Security Funds provincial expenditure and FEHpt  is the federal government expenditure in 
the same province in the same year t. 
 
6  Consider a numerical example: in province A subnational expenditure for health is 80 and federal 20. In 
province B the same numbers are 10 and 90. The indicator will have a value of 0,8 in A and of 1,0 in B.  It 
means simply that  subnational government in province A spend more for health than the corresponding 
governments in province B. This could be compensated by lower expenditure for education, but is not referred 
per se to any difference in decentralization. On the other hand federal expenditure is for native Canadians, 
military personnel, inmates of federal penitentiaries and the Royal Mounted Police, which has no relationship 
with decentralization. 
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Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina (2006) examine a sample of Spanish municipalities 
during 1995 and 2000. They attempt to estimate the impact of decentralization on typical 
municipal services, i.e., those that constitute the back-bone of any decentralized system. The 
study tries to evaluate the gains in productive efficiency brought by decentralization by using 
a non-parametric (FDH) estimate of the efficiency frontier. The study links inputs used—
more specifically municipal expenditure—to a number of indicators of municipal output, 
such as the waste collected and surface of public parks, and then select the most efficient 
units. The authors distinguish between (small) municipalities with fewer responsibilities and 
medium and large municipalities with extended responsibilities. After controlling for the 
operation of scale economies, municipalities with wider responsibilities should be ahead in 
the decentralization process. The results show that average efficiency is higher for large and 
medium-sized municipalities and that the differences tend to grow larger over time (a proxy 
for increased decentralization).  
 
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) provide one of the few cross-country studies for 
industrial economies. In their empirical model they regress infant mortality on the ratio of 
expenditure managed by local governments relative to that managed by the central 
government. They also introduce a few control variables, which refer to institutional 
capacity, such as political and civil rights, and corruption. These variables allow the authors 
to control the quality of political institutions. But without reference to the actual use of inputs 
one cannot perform a thorough assessment of production efficiency (with the partial 
exemption of GDP). The sample of low and high income countries is not specified. The 
results show that outcomes are positively correlated with decentralization. They also show 
that the marginal effects of decentralization diminish as GDP increases. This, if validated 
with other empirical evidence, would be an interesting result. It would mean that when 
countries grow their institutional capacity increases and thus the advantages of 
decentralization are likely to vanish, since the presumed differences between central and 
local management of public affairs disappear. 
 
Cantarero Prieto and Pascual Sanchez (2006) provide a similar analysis for 15 EU countries. 
However, their results—positive association between outcomes in health and 
decentralization—are weakened by, among other factors, their use of nation-wide indicators.  
There is now an increasing use of household surveys for the assessment of the access of poor 
and disadvantaged individuals and on the personal characteristics of users. When combined 
with fiscal and administrative data, household surveys can potentially allow for an 
examination of both efficiency and equity.  
 
Jakubowski and Topińska (2006, and forthcoming) use this methodology to evaluate the 
results of decentralization in education and health care in Poland. Their paper is an 
illustration of methods that could be used to evaluate the effects of decentralization—and 
also emphasizes the combination of fiscal and household information that is needed to carry 
out a proper evaluation. It provides for a before, during and after comparison, and illustrates 
the complex inter-relationships that arise.  The authors show that decentralization in Poland 
has not been up to the expectations in  terms of cost-effectiveness and a brought up a 
reduction in service delivery in the rural areas- This applies particularly to kindergartens. 
 
All the studies are valuable since they move the debate to practical policy questions, rather 
than purely political considerations that represent a black versus white perspective on 
decentralization. 
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Convergence of service provision across areas 
There is a small but increasing number of studies analyzing convergence across areas of 
levels of service provision. Empirical observation seems to confirm the theory—e.g., for 
health care in Switzerland. Switzerland is one of the most decentralized countries of the 
world. With respect to health care, the role of the federal government is limited to funding of 
health care to poor people (federal expenditure is 20% of total national health care) and to the 
definition of basic packages of health insurance (Crivelli, Filippini and Mosca, 2007).  
Provision of health care shows huge disparities between cantons, whether measured in terms 
of expenditure, use of inputs, or outcomes, such as differences in mortality rates amenable to 
absence of timely and effective care (Crivelli, Filippini and Mosca, 2007). 
 
One of the arguments used against decentralization is that it will increase disparities in levels 
of service delivery, if decentralization is not accompanied by the imposition of strict national 
standards on service levels and if substantial equalization grants are not provided.   
 
Montero-Granados and Juan de Dios Jimenez (2007) do not provide an analytical framework, 
but test the convergence hypothesis with reference to the Spanish regions in the health sector.  
Health care is provided by a National Health System funded (with the exception of Navarre 
and the Basque Country) by general taxation and small user co-payments. Standards are 
determined by the central government, while regional authorities are responsible for 
planning, organization, and management of health care, and are provided with a centrally 
determined block-grant allocated according to an unadjusted capitation formula. The authors 
use two measures of convergence derived from the literature on growth. They are the sigma 
(s)  and the beta (b) convergence. The first measure is based on changes of standard deviation 
over time. When variation declines, there is more homogeneity of outcomes, or of behaviors. 
According to the second measure, convergence increases when laggard regions improve 
quicker than more advanced. 
 
Outcomes of health care include life expectancy at birth and infant mortality, while 
decentralization is measured by access by regions to health responsibilities. The authors also 
use a host of variables, other than decentralization, that are expected to impact on outcomes.  
The results show convergence taking place at the extremes. That is, less developed regions 
improve faster than more advanced regions, while in the middle, there is a big increase in 
variation. These results are open to interpretation. One could say decentralization fills the 
most optimistic expectations, as the difference between the rich and the poor regions are 
leveled and at the same time individual (middle) regions adjust to their preferences. One can 
also argue that the results confirm the expectations that there is little to expect in terms of 
homogeneity from decentralization.   
 
Ahlin and Mörk (2007) analyze the impact on convergence due to different stages in 
decentralization in the Swedish education sector. Sweden took three major steps to 
decentralize its education system. In 1991 formal responsibility for compulsory, upper 
secondary and adult education was moved to the local government level. Teachers were 
transferred to municipalities, but salaries were still determined centrally, as well as curricula 
and national evaluations. Distinct specific grants for education, such as for books and school 
premises were unified into a single specific grant. In 1993, all sector specific grants—such as 
those for education, health and social protection—were unified into a single block-grant, 
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giving municipalities the freedom, for example, to move resources from education to social 
protection (or vice versa). In 1996, teachers’ wages setting was moved to municipalities and 
new block grant system was introduced, based on revenue and cost equalization. Note that 
since 1992, the central government introduced public funding for independent schools, thus 
inserting more competition between public and private education. Convergence is analyzed 
with reference to two typical input indicators: per pupil spending and teacher-pupil ratio. The 
paper shows that no appreciable change has taken place in the pattern of per pupil spending, 
while variation in teacher-pupil ratio has decreased over time. The authors explain the 
surprising result (challenging traditional theory) in terms of the strategic interactions between 
local politicians—local choices are constrained  by neighboring municipalities’ choices. 
However, they do not control for the varying equalizing impact of different systems of 
grants. Subsequent regression analysis shows that with decentralization, higher reliance on 
own-source of revenues had an impact on per pupil expenditure, but this effect may have 
been neutralized by the equalization grants. Thus the power given to local governments by 
decentralization of responsibilities may have been offset, by the ability of the central 
government to influence local choices through the allocation of grants.  
 
Preference matching  
 
The empirical literature exclusively devoted to preference matching is still relatively small. 
In fact, most studies link preference matching with growth, as illustrated below. 
 
A well-structured and accurate analysis is provided by Strumpf and Oberholzer (2002) with 
reference to regulation of the liquor sales in the US States between 1934 and 1970. In 1933 
the Prohibition Act was repealed and the States were made responsible for liquor control. 
States then had the choice between centralized/statewide regulation, or devolution of 
regulation to their local governments (counties, municipalities and towns). Initially, seven 
states prohibited sale of package liquor, while among non-prohibitionist states 20, and later 
34, devolved regulation to their local communities where the issue was decided in local 
elections. 
 
Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee construct, and test with regression analysis, a model predicting 
that decentralization of regulation would be observed in states with huge heterogeneity of 
preferences on liquor sales, while centralization should prevail with less extreme disparities. 
The test is conducted in two sequential stages. The first stage refers to (3100) counties where 
the tastes of the decisive voters are estimate using variables that according to the literature 
should influence the taste for liquor, such as religious affiliation and socioeconomic 
variables. Tastes will predict the policy—wet or dry- adopted by the community. The second 
stage refers to states and is based on regression of decentralization of policy with two 
measures of within-state taste heterogeneity. The results show that the states with more 
heterogeneous preferences have been more prone to decentralize. 
 
Arze del Granado, Martinez Vasquez and Mc Nab (2005) provide specific empirical testing 
of preference matching, also with reference to developing countries. More precisely, the 
paper analyzes the impact on fiscal decentralization on the provision of publicly provided 
private goods, such as health and education. The analysis is based on 45 developed and 
developing countries between 1973 and 2000. The dependent variables are the share of local 
health and education expenditure on total local expenditure, while the independent variable is 
the share of local total general government expenditure. The results show that 
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decentralization brings about an increase of the share of these two categories of expenditure, 
but the generality of the findings may be questioned. Since there is no evidence – but only a 
general presumption - in the paper that more expenditure for health and education means 
effectively in every country better adaptation to local preferences, more spending for these 
two sectors could simply derive from the fact that these are the sectors where decentralization 
has taken place. 
  
There are also a few studies of preference matching referring specifically to developing 
countries.  Faguet (2004) and Faguet and Sanchez (2006) analyse Bolivia and Colombia : 
These countries  have undergone a far-reaching  decentralization process. While Bolivia has 
relied mostly on strengthening of municipalities, Colombia’s decentralization was initially 
based on strengthening municipalities and has relied subsequently on the regional 
governments (departments). Bolivia also initiated elections of departmental governors, but 
the process has run into difficulties over the sharing of natural revenues. In both countries, 
subnational revenue has substantially been increased through the increased sharing of 
national tax collections—much of this was earmarked to investments in education and health.   
 
Both studies assess, first, how decentralization affects the composition of local expenditure 
by sector in line with citizens’ preferences and secondly how decentralized spending 
improves the outcomes of education, although from a partial point of view, namely 
enrollments. The studies exert a considerable effort in singling out local preferences for 
expenditure. They argue that, with decentralization, investment priorities shift from typical 
services such as water, sewerage and roads to education and health. This shift is assumed to 
be more in line with people’s preferences. There is, however, no demonstration of this. In 
both countries decentralization brought about an increase in school enrollment, as would 
have been expected considering the increased amount of investment. There is, however, no 
precise checking of the correspondence between increased expenditure and increased 
enrollments. In other words, the studies do not provide conclusive evidence about gains in 
production efficiency reached through  decentralization per se. 
 
Inchauste (this volume)  uses of both fiscal and household survey data to check whether 
resources channeled to municipalities have been distributed as intended under the enhanced 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and whether there is any evidence of 
absorptive capacity constraints, particularly by poor municipalities. The paper also 
investigates whether the resources that actually have been spent have had any impact on 
short-term social indicators, such as illiteracy rate, rate of unattended respiratory diseases, 
and home access to electricity and water. Results again do not provide convincing evidence 
of efficient working of local governments. For example municipalities, particularly the 
poorer ones, show substantial problems in transforming increased revenue in effective 
spending .For education, for example, increases in education transfers do not significantly 
affect the share of children not attending school. When looking at infrastructure indicators, 
there is still no significant effect of changes in spending or transfers on the share of homes 
with access to water and electricity services. More in general, there is no evidence of a clear 
improvement of conditions in the poorest municipalities, or for the poorest segments of the 
population. 
 
Solé-Ollé and  Esteller-Moré (2005) analyze the impact of decentralization on the pattern of 
investment in roads and education premises during 1977-1998 in Spain. The paper is well 
constructed, although it is not strictly a test of preference matching, but rather an efficiency 
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test of spending decisions. The main focus of the analysis is, in fact, testing if  after 
decentralization investment decisions have been more closely targeted to effective needs, 
such as, more road construction in congested areas and more school construction in areas 
with higher student population growth and if investment activities have become more cost 
conscious. The results show that with decentralization the regional allocation of investment 
in these two sectors has become better adapted to local conditions and needs, thus showing a 
higher level of efficiency than under the previous centralized regime. 
 
Table 3.  Decentralization:  preference matching and growth--summary of selected  
papers 
Author(s) Countries of 
reference 
Period of 
reference 
 Fiscal 
variables of 
reference  
Growth 
variables of 
reference 
Decentralization 
Index 
Main results 
Akai and 
Sakata 
US counties 1993-
2000 
 GDP 
growth rate 
 
Fiscal with 
emphasis on 
tax autonomy 
Growth is 
positively 
related to tax 
autonomy and 
specifically to 
non-bailouts 
Arze del 
Granado 
Martinez 
Vasquez 
and Mc 
Nab  
45 countries 
developed 
and 
developing 
countries 
1973-
2000 
Ratio of 
education and 
health 
expenditures 
to total public 
expenditures 
 Fiscal 
decentralization 
Likely increase 
of expenditure 
for health and 
education 
Ebel and  
Yilmaz  
19 OECD 
countries 
1997-99 Public 
sector’s 
expenditure 
share of GDP 
GDP 
growth rate 
 
  
Faguet  Bolivia 
Sample of 
municipalities 
1991-
1996 
Investment 
for 
Education; 
Water and 
Sanitation; 
Watershed 
Management 
 Fiscal 
decentralization 
Increased 
spending in 
poorer areas  
Faguet 
and 
Sanchez  
 
Bolivia and 
Colombia. 
Samples of 
municipalities 
Mid 
1990’s  
early 
2000’s. 
Investment in 
education 
 Fiscal 
decentralization 
Increased 
spending for 
education and 
expanded 
enrolments 
Jin and 
Zou  
17 industrial 
and 15 
developing  
countries 
1980-
1994 
Subnational, 
national, and 
aggregate 
government 
size: the ratio 
of total 
expenditure at 
corresponding 
level to GDP 
 Fiscal and 
regulatory 
decentralization 
Increase of 
subnational 
expenditure 
and reduction 
of national 
expenditure 
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Solé-
Ollé and  
Esteller-
Moré  
Spain 1977-
1998 
(44  
provinces) 
Investment 
road and 
education  
 Fiscal and 
regulatory 
decentralization 
Better 
adaptation of 
investment to 
local needs 
Thiessen  
(2000) 
26 mainly 
developed  
countries 
1975-
1995 
Annual 
growth rate of 
real gross 
fixed capital 
formation (as 
indicator of 
physical 
investment) 
Growth rate 
of per 
capita GDP  
 
Total factor 
productivity 
growth 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
Growth 
initially 
increases but 
then  declines 
with 
decentralization 
Thiessen  
(2003) 
14 and 21 
high-income 
OECD 
countries 
1973-
1998 
Average 
annual 
investment 
share in GDP  
Log 
difference 
GDP per 
working-
age person 
 
Average 
annual total 
factor 
productivity 
growth 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
Growth 
initially 
increases but 
then  declines 
with 
dcentralization 
 
 
Decentralization and growth 
Although there is a large empirical literature on the link between decentralization and 
growth, the consensus appears to be that any relationship is relatively weak. A good survey 
of  its main results has already been provided by Breuss and Eller (2004, see e.g., page 11). 
 
The empirical literature refers to samples of countries, as in Thiessen (2000 and 2003), Ebel 
and  Yilmaz (2002) and to distinct countries, such as in the papers by Behnisch et al. (2003) 
on Germany and by Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2004) on Switzerland. The 
empirical findings are mixed. Negative findings are more frequent for European countries 
and with a longer term perspective. 
 
We limit our consideration to the studies of Thiessen (2000 and 2003), which are mostly 
devoted to OECD countries. The relationship between decentralization and growth is 
represented by a bell-shaped curve, meaning that when countries move from low to medium 
levels of decentralization, growth accelerates, but higher decentralization will reduce growth.  
Part of this explanation derives from the positive impact on capital formation deriving from 
decentralization. However, the key variables used – average rate of growth from 1973 to 
1998 and average indexes of fiscal decentralization- raise a few doubts on the results even 
after other variables that impact growth are controlled for. Take the case of Italy. Most 
decentralization reforms were introduced in the 1990’s, but growth declined in that period, 
while lower decentralization and higher growth characterize the previous years. Ireland has 
the highest rate of growth, but has always been a highly centralized country. Norway has 
promoted some recentralization, but its high rate of growth is due to oil. Japan is close to 
Ireland in the sense that no change towards decentralization is observable. However, 
economic growth had declined in the second half of the period.  
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Convergence/divergence in regional rates of growth 
When countries decentralize, less developed regions fearing losing in terms of growth 
because of  lesser support from the central government. This looks prima facie reasonable, 
although increasing divergence may be associated to the peculiarities of the decentralization 
process. Akai and Sakata (2005) provide good analytical and empirical analysis for the US. 
They distinguish between two different concepts/impacts of decentralization. The first refers 
to decentralization of resources. The presumable impact of decentralization is to increase 
disparities among regions. Here the impact of decentralization will arise mostly through the 
expenditure multiplier. The second concept refers to decentralization as a commitment 
device.  Decentralization occurs when subnational governments rely on their own sources of 
revenue with a hard budget constraint. In this case, regional efficiency in spending and self-
reliance will be increased, with likely positive effects on growth. Akai and Sakata test their 
model with reference to an unspecified number of US counties during 1993-2000. They also 
use a number of appropriate control variables in order to take into account many of the 
factors that impact on growth. They results show that decentralization, as a commitment 
device, has a significant impact on the reduction of regional disparities in growth. The results 
by Akai and Sakata are confirmed by Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire (2003) with a detailed 
analysis of a group of five OECD countries (Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the US) plus 
India. 
 
The exploration of link between purely regulatory decentralization and growth is also an 
important one. When subnational, particularly regional, governments are empowered with 
growth-related responsibilities, there are clearly new potentialities to foster growth, but 
regional growth inducing policies can be construed at the expenses of other regions. There 
also worries - for example in Italy - of excessive regional regulation in growth related 
sectors, such as the environment, health and labor. These issues have been initially explored 
by Weingast (1995), who maintains that a federal system is market-preserving if it has three 
characteristics: i) subnational governments have primary regulatory responsibility over the 
economy; ii) a common market is ensured, preventing the lower governments from using 
their regulatory authority to erect trade barriers against the goods and services from other 
political units; and iii) the lower governments face a hard budget constraint, that is, they have 
neither the ability to print money nor access to unlimited credit. Weingast and his coauthors 
(for example Lin,  Yifu  and Liu, 2003, Cao,  Qian and Weingast, 1997) have made  
extensive empirical analysis of market preserving federalism theory with reference to China. 
Unfortunately, similar studies for other, and specifically OECD countries, are still missing. 
Again this may have been the case during the early years of the economic reforms, but 
increasing inequalities and other potential constraints are likely to have changed the 
composition of the “growth-engine” in recent years. 
 
 
E. Conclusions 
Confronted with the often asserted benefits of decentralization for enhanced service delivery, 
efficiency and preference matching the evidence is not quite conclusive. Despite the number 
of empirical studies available, general conclusions are still tentative because of the context-
specific nature of decentralization processes and of their outcomes. Of course, it is possible 
to draw firmer conclusions when, as in the case of Spain, there are quite a large number of 
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studies. The studies for Spain show a convergence of positive, although cautious, 
conclusions, especially concerning preference-matching. Also for Switzerland, some positive 
results emerge, particularly regarding allocative efficiency. In general, the evidence referring 
to industrialized countries is more positive than that for developing countries, where 
decentralization has additional goals to meet and where institutions are generally weaker than 
those in mature economies. 
 
There is also not  enough specific evidence to  conclude whether ethnically or culturally 
driven processes of decentralization produce better or worse results than those driven only by 
efficiency considerations. Surely, the cases of Spain and Switzerland show that cultural and 
linguistic divides do not necessarily have a negative impact.  But the quality of institutions is 
a critical precondition for the successes seen in Spain and Switzerland. 
 
In theoretical terms, the claims that decentralization enhances service delivery have to be 
reconciled with the recognition of the joint nature of the spending and revenue constraints, 
and  of the fact that lower levels of administration are likely not to have adequate own-source 
revenues for effective hard budget constraints, nor the governance, budgeting and reporting 
infrastructure to make decentralization effective. 
There is relatively poor evidence to characterize effective links between decentralization and 
growth. Claims of improvements in developing countries may be due to the general 
development process and growth, perhaps improved central decision making with local 
implementation, while linkages with decentralization are tenuous.  
Convergence of levels of service delivery does not seem to be a prevailing pattern, but this 
should be an expected  outcome of decentralization, which rewards capacity and availability 
of resources. Clearly, the poor jurisdictions should  also benefit from the growing exposure to 
efficiency that derives from increased autonomy. There is, however, still little evidence to 
prove this. 
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Table A1:  Expenditure assignments in African countries 
 
 
Countries Level of 
government 
Policy 
responsibilities 
  
Functional 
responsibilities 
Education 
 
Functional 
Responsibilities 
Health 
Ethiopia Central Typical functions of 
federal states 
Framework 
legislation 
Financing 
 
 
Framework 
legislation 
Financing 
 
 State/Regional Regulation of 
education, health, 
roads and financing of 
local government 
 
Regulation, 
financing and 
monitoring 
Regulation, 
financing and 
monitoring 
 Local Education, health, 
roads, growth 
promotion and basic 
urban services (when 
transition is 
completed) 
 
 
Hiring of teachers 
Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
Hiring of medical 
personnel 
Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
Uganda Central Typical of 
decentralized systems 
Policy 
Financing 
(including wages) 
 
Policy 
Financing 
(including wages) 
 
 Regional 
(Districts) 
Education, health, 
roads and basic urban 
services 
Hiring of teachers; 
Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
Hiring of medical 
personnel, 
Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
 Local (Counties, 
parishes, 
villages) 
 
 
Mostly urban services Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
 
Administration 
O&M 
Infrastructure 
Rwanda Central Most  All 
 
All 
 Local Basic urban services 
and some economic 
services (water, 
agriculture). 
Devolution of 
education & health is 
planned 
 
 
 
  
 
Nigeria 
 
Central 
 
Typical functions of 
federal states 
 
Policy, financing of 
teachers 
 
 
Policy, financing of 
health care 
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 State/regional Concurrent legislative 
powers with the 
federal government in 
education, health, 
public works.  
 
Hiring of teachers 
Administration 
O&M 
Hiring of medical 
personnel; 
Administration 
O&M 
 Local Typical urban 
infrastructure and 
services 
 
Some maintenance; 
responsibility for 
primary education 
Some maintenance; 
Responsibility for 
basic health care 
 
Ghana Central Typical functions of 
unitary states 
Policy, financing, 
teachers 
Policy, financing, 
medical personnel 
 Provincial Feeder roads, abattoirs Building and O&M 
primary, middle and 
secondary schools 
Public health  and 
public hygiene 
 Local 
 
 
Typical urban services  
 
 
Tanzania Central Typical functions of 
unitary states 
Financing  and tight 
control through 
standards on inputs 
an outputs 
Financing  and tight 
control through 
standards on inputs 
an outputs 
 Local Primary education, 
health services, water 
supply, local roads 
and agricultural 
extension.  
 
Most functions, 
very tightly 
controlled. 
Most functions, 
but....as for 
education. 
Senegal Central Most functions Most 
 
Most 
 Local Typical urban services Building and O&M 
for primary 
 
Building and O&M 
for health centers 
DR  Congo Central  Typical functions of 
federal states 
 
Policy, financing 
and teachers 
Policy financing and 
medical personnel 
 Regional Education, health, 
social protection, 
sports, culture, roads 
Building and O&M, 
supply of material 
Building and O&M, 
medical supplies 
and equipment 
 
 Local Typical local services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Local clinics 
South 
Africa 
Central Typical functions of 
federal states 
  
 Regional Concurrent legislative 
powers with the 
federal government 
concerning roads and 
transport, economic 
affairs, social services, 
health and education, 
public works. 
Recruitment of 
teachers, 
administration 
O&M 
Investment, supply 
of equipment 
Recruitment of 
doctors, 
administration,                              
O&M 
Investment, supply 
of medical 
equipment 
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 Local Provision of urban 
infrastructure and 
basic services, such as 
water, sanitation, 
transport and roads 
None for localities, 
but possibly some 
role for local 
communities and 
families 
None for localities, 
but possibly some 
role for local 
communities and 
families 
 
 
 
